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Abstract
In this paper we show the importance of cost asymmetry and de-
mand curvature in the e¤ect of a uniform output subsidy policy in
an economic union. We consider an economic union formed by two
countries each with a single …rm producing a homogeneous good. We
…nd that when …rms have di¤erent cost, the optimal level of the uni-
form subsidy can be negative if the demand is concave enough. The
low cost …rm expands its market share if the demand function is suf-
…ciently convex whereas in the case of a concave demand function it
is the higher cost …rm which gains market share. This implies that
a uniform output subsidy policy may cause a change in production
e¢ciency. Finally, we consider how a divergence between private and
social costs of public funds may a¤ect the desirability of such a subsidy
policy.
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11 Introduction
This paper focuses on the implications of uniform output subsidies as a wel-
fare maximising policy in an imperfectly competitive market. We consider
the case of an economic union as an area formed by di¤erent countries or re-
gions in which there is a common economic authority that decides the same
level of subsidies for all the …rms.1 We assume the existence of two countries
each with a single …rm. Firms produce a homogeneous good with constant
return to scale and compete in quantities. The objective of the common
economic authority is to maximize the social welfare and we assume that the
only instrument that it can use is an output subsidy. The question is how to
do it. It is easy to see that a carefully chosen subsidy per unit of output to
each …rm is e¤ective in achieving an optimal outcome. However, it may be
politically infeasible (it will be di¢cult to justify di¤erent output subsidies
for each country) or technically di¢cult to apply di¤erential subsidies.
The use of output subsidies have been widely studied in the context of
strategic trade policy by Brander and Spencer (1985), De Meza (1986), Neary
(1994) and Collie (1993). Brander and Spencer (1985) were the …rst to show
that, in a Cournot duopoly setting, an export subsidy to a home …rm is
desirable because it raises the …rm’s market share and pro…ts at the expense
of its foreign competitor. Further analysis of …rm asymmetries can be found
in De Meza (1986) and Neary (1994). Neary (1994) considers the problem
in which the social cost of public funds exceeds unity, …nding that they are
optimal only for surprisingly low values of the social cost of public funds.
Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) show that if domestic …rms do not have
identical cots, the optimal trade policy isdetermined by the interplay between
the Her…ndahl index of concentration and the elasticity of demand. For an
excellent survey on strategic trade policy see Brander (1995).
In this paper we consider the existence of an economic union with two
producing countries with a …rm in each country. Countries (…rms) 1 and
2, produce a homogeneous good for the common market. We assume that
there is no trade of the good with the rest of the world, i. e. all production is
consumed in the domestic market, in order to study in pure form the e¤ect
of the output subsidy.2 We assume the existence of a common economic
1For instance, the European Union has attempted to harmonise all aid being given by
the governments of member states to the di¤erent industrial sectors. This was done to
eliminate or reduce distortion of competition within the Community.
2Note that our model is similar to the third-maket model of Brander and Spencer
2authority that introduces an output subsidy. The economic authority has no
other objective than to maximize the social welfare taking both producers
and consumers into account. Hence, in this case, the economic authority
chooses a certain level of subsidies, the same for the two …rms, in terms of
welfare maximization. We want to answer the following two questions: i)
which is the optimal level of the uniform output subsidy policy? ii) which
are the e¤ect of the uniform output subsidy policy on output, market share
and payo¤s under …rm heterogeneity?
We …nd that the uniform output subsidy level can be negative (a tax)
under …rm heterogeneity when the demand function is su¢ciently concave.
Assuming that the uniform output subsidy level is positive, we also …nd
that the optimal uniform output subsidy policy can a¤ect …rms di¤erently
depending on their cost di¤erences and on the curvature of the demand func-
tion. We distinguish three possibilities. First, for su¢ciently convex demand
functions, the more e¢cient …rm increases its market share and the output
di¤erential with respect to the less e¢cient …rm. Inside this region, for some
cases the less e¢cient …rm decreases its output. Second, for not too convex
demand functions, both …rms increase their output, the output di¤erential
increases but the less e¢cient …rm increases its market share. Therefore,
the output increases of the less e¢cient …rm is proportionally greater than
the one of the more e¢cient …rm. Third, for concave demand functions, the
output di¤erential decreases, the less e¢cient …rm increases its market share
and even, if the demand function is su¢ciently concave, the more e¢cient
…rm decreases its output. In term of payo¤s, the more e¢cient …rm always
increase its payo¤s with the introduction of the uniform output subsidy. The
more striking conclusion is that when the cost di¤erences are su¢ciently large
and in the case of convex demand functions, there exists situations for which
the less e¢cient …rm decreases its payo¤s and therefore the less e¢cient …rm
prefers no output subsidies!
Finally, we consider the (more realistic) possibility that the social cost of
public funds exceeds unity. We …nd that the shadow price of public funds
depends positively on the cost di¤erences between the …rms.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the model
and the optimal uniform output subsidy in the economic union and its e¤ect
in term of output, market share and pro…ts of the two …rms. Section 3
(1985) considering an economic union formed by the two producing countries plus the
third (consuming) country.
3considers the existence of a cost asymmetry between private and social costs
of public funds. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We will concentrate on a quantity-setter model. There is a homogenous
good produced by …rms that have no objectives other than pro…ts. It is well-
known that under symmetry, the introduction of a subsidy increases social
welfare and …rms’ payo¤. However, in general the level of output subsidies
for each …rm depends on the elasticity, on the degree of concavity of the
inverse demand function and on the technology. In order to study when it is
social welfare improving to introduce a uniform output subsidy when we have
di¤erent …rms we will assume that we have two …rms, 1 and 2, with constant
marginal cost functions denoted by C1(x1) = cx1 and C2(x2) = ¯cx2, where
c > 0 and ¯ ¸ 1, i. e., without loss of generality we assume that …rm 1 is
more cost competitive than …rm 2. We will assume that in each country or
region it is located a …rm. Let p be the market price of the product and p(x)
be the inverse demand function mapping aggregate output into prices where
x is total output. We assume that the decision on subsidies is irreversible and
prior to decision of …rms on output. This situation is model as a two-stage
game. In stage 1, the social planner choose a subsidy level per unit of output.
In stage 2, …rms simultaneously choose output levels for the common market.
Let s be the uniform subsidy per unit of output received by the …rms where
…rms i’s payo¤ functions is given by
Ui(xi;x;s) = p(x)xi ¡ Ci (xi) + sxi (1)
and the consumer surplus is given by
U3(x) = V (x) ¡ px (2)
where V (x) is a strictly increasing function.
De…nition 1 A Cournot equilibrium is a list of outputs (x¤
1;::;x¤
n) such that











i + xi)xi ¡ Ci(xi) + sxi 8xi 2 <
+
4From now on we will assume that the Cournot equilibrium is interior.
Social welfare (denoted by W) is the sum of consumer and producers’s payo¤
functions net of the value of the subsidy payments
W = V (x) ¡ C1(x1) ¡ C2(x2) (3)
Thus, we can de…ne an optimal allocation as follows:
De…nition 2 A level of subsidy so is optimal if it maximizes
V (x(s)) ¡ C1(x1(s)) ¡ C2(x2(s)) (4)
Our …rst assumption restricts the payo¤ function of each …rm to be twice
continuously di¤erentiable (³
2):
Assumption 1. Ui(¢) 2 ³
2 for all i = 1;2.
In order to simplify notation, when the context is clear, we will denote
derivatives by primes, i.e.
@p(x)
@x = p0 (x), etc. The next assumption requires,
on the one hand, that the inverse demand function be either concave or ”not
too” convex and, on the other hand, it bounds the degree of economies of
scale.
Assumption 2. 2+ R ¸ 0 where R =
p00(x)
p0(x) x is a measure of the degree of
concavity (convexity) of the inverse demand function.
Finally, the next assumption means that the inverse demand function
p(x) is strictly decreasing, i.e. that V (x) is strictly concave.
Assumption 3. Ui(¢) is strictly decreasing on x given x1 and x2, for all
i = 1;2.
Di¤erentiating …rst order condition of pro…t maximization for …rms with




p0 (x)(1 + ®iR)
dxj
ds + 1
p0 (x)(2 + ®iR)
for i 6= j and i;j = 1;2 (5)
where ®i =
xi
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p0 (x)(3 + R)






p0 (x)(3 + R)
(7)
From expression (6) it follows that …rm i’s change in output depends on
the di¤erences in market share between both …rms in the case of non-linear
demand functions. In the case of convex demand functions, …rm i’s change
in output is larger as the market share of this …rm is greater. In the case of
concave demand functions, …rm i’s change in output is lower as the market
share of this …rms is greater. Note also that total output increases with the
introduction of the uniform subsidy.
The social welfare, de…ned as the sum of the consumer and producers’s
payo¤s functions net of the subsidy cost, is given by
W = V (x) ¡cx1 ¡ ¯cx2 (8)





p0 (x)(3 + R)
[(2p(x) ¡ c ¡ ¯c) ¡ R(®1 ¡®2)c(¯ ¡ 1)] (9)
Note that the sign of dW
ds in expression (9) depends on the sign of the
expression in brackets. From the …rst order condition of pro…t maximization
for …rms we know that the …rst term of the expression in brackets is positive.
Therefore, the change in the social welfare depends on the degree of concavity
(convexity) of the inverse demand function and on the di¤erences in cost
between the …rms. Social welfare increases with the introduction of subsidies
if the demand function is convex or linear (or for concave demand functions
if the …rms are su¢ciently similar). This is due to the fact that in the case of
convex demand functions the gains in consumer surplus from lower prices are
large compared to the cost of the subsidy. In the case of concave demands
and …rms su¢ciently di¤erent, we have that the gains in consumer surplus
are small relative to the subsidy cost.
From expression (6) and the …rst order condition of the welfare maxi-












6where » = ¡
p0(x)
p(x) x is the elasticity of the inverse demand function. As it can
be observed, the equilibrium uniform subsidy is positive for convex or linear
demand functions. Note also that the uniform subsidy is always positive if
…rms are symmetric in costs. However, if the demand is concave (R > 0),
and there are di¤erences in costs such as (®1 ¡ ®2)
2R > 1, expression (10)
is negative (a tax)
Figure 1 shows the locus for a zero output subsidy as a function of the
di¤erences in cost and the curvature of the demand function. If the …rms are
su¢ciently similar, the optimal level of subsidy is positive but for very con-
cave demand function. On the contrary, if the …rms are su¢ciently di¤erent
the optimal level of subsidy is negative (a tax) for positive low values of R.
[Insert here Figure 1]
We now study the e¤ects of the uniform output subsidy policy over the
…rms in terms of outputs, market shares and pro…ts under the assumption
that the optimal level of subsidy is positive, i.e. either the demand function
is not too concave or the cost di¤erences between the …rms are not too large
or both. This policy shifts out the best-response functions of both …rms, and
then, total output increases, prices are driven downwards and therefore the
consumer surplus increases. However, if …rms have di¤erent cost functions
we can expect an asymmetric e¤ect of this common policy. In fact, the
introduction of the subsidies may increase the output of the less e¢cient
…rm and even increase its market share. In this case, the economy as a whole
would produce less e¢ciently. The next proposition presents the results in
terms of the output of the …rms.3
Proposition 3 In the case of convex demand functions (R<0), the introduc-
tion of the uniform subsidy provokes an increase on the output of the lower
cost …rm and an increase on the di¤erences in output between the …rms. In
the case of concave demand functions (R>0), the introduction of the subsidy
provokes an increase on the output of the higher cost …rms and a decrease on
the di¤erences in output between the …rms. For linear demands (R=0), the
introduction of the subsidy increases the output of the two …rms by the same
amount.
3The same result was obtained by Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) when analysing the
optimal trade policy in the case of domestic …rms with non-identical unit costs.
7Proof. From expression (6) we have that the change in output of …rm 1 (the




1 + (®2 ¡ ®1)R
p0 (x)(3 + R)
(11)
From A.3 and A.2’, the denominator in the above expression is negative.
Since (®2 ¡®1) < 0, the above expression is positive for convex or linear
demand functions. In the case of concave demand functions, expression (11)





1 + (®1 ¡ ®2)R
p0 (x)(3 + R)
(12)
where the above expression is positive for concave or linear demand functions.
In the case of convex demand functions, expression (12) is positive for R(®2¡
®1) < 1. From the …rst order conditions of pro…t maximization for …rms we
have that the di¤erence in output between the …rms is given by:



















p0(x)(3+R) > 0 and p0(x) < 0, the sign of the above expres-
sion depends on the curvature of the inverse demand function. The output
di¤erential increases (decreases) for convex (concave) demand functions and
it does not change for linear demand functions.
In the next proposition, we present the results in terms of the market
shares of the …rms.
Proposition 4 The introduction of the uniform subsidy increases the market
share of the low cost …rm if R < ¡1, increases the market share of the high
cost …rm if R > ¡1 and does not change the market share of the …rms for
R = ¡1.
8Proof. From the …rst order conditions of pro…t maximization for …rms we
have that the di¤erence in market share between the …rms is given by:


















p0(x)(3+R) > 0 and p0(x) < 0, the sign of the above expression
depends on the curvature of the inverse demand function. The market share
di¤erential increases (decreases) for R < ¡1 (R > ¡1) demand functions
and it does not change for R = ¡1.
The above two propositions shows that the optimal uniform output sub-
sidy policy can a¤ect …rms di¤erently depending on their cost di¤erences and
on the curvature of the demand function. In Figure 2 we present the changes
in output and market share of the …rms as a function of the curvature of the
demand function. We distinguish three regions. For R < ¡1, the more e¢-
cient …rm increases its market share and the output di¤erential with respect
to the less e¢cient …rm. Inside this region, if the demand function is su¢-
ciently convex, the less e¢cient …rm decreases its output. For ¡1 < R < 0,
both …rms increase their output, the output di¤erential increases but the less
e¢cient …rm increases its market share. Therefore, the output increases of
the less e¢cient …rm is proportionally greater than the one of the more e¢-
cient …rm. For R > 0, the output di¤erential decreases, the less e¢cient …rm
increases its market share and even, if the demand function is su¢ciently
concave, the more e¢cient …rm decreases its output.
[Insert here Figure 2]
Proposition 5 The introduction of the uniform subsidy increases the payo¤s
of the low cost …rm, whereas the payo¤s of the high cost …rm may decrease
for su¢ciently convex demand functions if the …rms are su¢ciently di¤erent.
Proof. The change in the payo¤s of …rm 1 (the low cost …rm) with respect

















From the …rm 1’s …rst order condition of pro…t maximization we have
that
@U1
@x1 = 0 and provided that
@U1
@x2 = p0(x)x1 and
@U1









where the above expression is always positive for any value of R. Therefore,
the payo¤s of the low cost …rm always increase with the introduction of the









where this expression can be negative if the demand function is su¢ciently
convex and the cost di¤erences between the …rm are su¢ciently high.
From Proposition 5 it can be drawn two conclusions. The more e¢cient
…rm always increase its payo¤s with the introduction of the uniform output
subsidy. The more striking conclusion is that when the cost di¤erences are
su¢ciently large and in the case of convex demand functions, there exists
situations for which the less e¢cient …rm prefers no output subsidies!
Finally, Propositions3, 4and 5 provide a simple explanation of the change
in social welfare due to the introduction of the subsidy. The uniform out-
put subsidy policy in the economic union produces two e¤ects. On the one
hand, the so-called policy coordination e¤ect, which implies that total output
increases, prices are driven downwards and therefore the consumer surplus
increases. On the other hand, the so-called homogenization e¤ect, which
implies that the introduction of the output subsidy changes the output dif-
ferential between the …rms and their market shares changing the level of pro-
duction e¢ciency in the economy as a whole. From Proposition 4 we know
that if R > ¡1, the introduction of the subsidy makes the less e¢cient …rm
to increase his market share. Therefore, the economy as a whole produces
less e¢ciently. On the contrary if R < ¡1 the more e¢cient …rm expands
its market share and then, the optimal subsidy policy causes an increase in
the total e¢ciency level of the union. If the cost di¤erences between …rms
are low, the technological e¤ect disappears. As the cost di¤erences become
larger, the technological e¤ects also becomes more important. The sum of
these two e¤ects explains why the optimal policy in the economic union is a
10tax when the demand is su¢ciently concave and cost asymmetry is large. In
this situation an output subsidy causes a reduction in the total production
e¢ciency level of the economic union together with the fact that the gains in
consumer surplus are small relative to the subsidy cost when the demand is
concave. Our results in terms of the optimal subsidy policy are di¤erent to
the ones obtained by Van Long and Soubeyran (1997) due to the fact that
consumers surplus is a component of our de…nition of the social welfare.
3 Private versus social cost of subsidies
In the preceding analysis private and social costs of public funds have been
treated as equivalent. However, in the real world, raising subsidy revenue
imposes distortionary costs on the economy, implying that the opportunity
cost of a dollar of public funds might exceed 1. Neary (1994) considers
the problem of a pro…t-shifting export subsidy in the third-market model in
which the social cost of public funds exceeds unity. He …nds that export
subsidies are optimal only for surprisingly low values of the social cost of
public funds (4/3 for a linear demand, with an upper limit of 2 for non-linear
demands) and, if subsidies are justi…ed, they should be higher the more cost
competitive the domestic …rms are.
Following Neary (1994) we consider a weight parameter ±, to the subsidy
payments that may exceed unity, that is, the government places a greater
weight on subsidy expenses than on private pro…t generation. Therefore, the
social welfare of the union is de…ned as:
W = V (x) ¡cx1 ¡ ¯cx2 ¡(± ¡ 1)sx1 ¡(± ¡ 1)sx2 (20)
where ± ¸ 1; is the relative weight of subsidy cost. As we can observe, as
± increases, the cost in term of welfare of the output subsidy increases. If ±
is su¢ciently high, the optimal policy would be a tax instead of an output
subsidy. Several arguments regarding this kind of asymmetry can be consid-
ered. First, Gruenspecht (1988) argues that it may re‡ect the deadweight
cost of raising taxes elsewhere in the economy.4 Brander (1995) notes that
4Browning (1987) and Carmichael (1991) give estimations of the parameter ± for the
US economy. Browning (1987) under the assumption that subsidies are …nanced by tax on
labour earnings obtains a value of ± between 1.10 and 4.03, with preferred estimates lying
between 1.32 and 1.47. Carmichael (1991) obtains an estimate of 1.34 for credit subsidies
for the export of Boeing 737-200 aircraft.
11this will be the case when the government puts less weight on shareholders’
welfare than on taxpayer’s welfare for income distribution or other reasons.
Second, the asymmetry between the private and social cost of subsidies can
arise from the fact that domestic …rms can be foreign-owned.5 Neary (1991)
gives a third explanation of ± as the limited budget available to a public
agency charged with allocating subsidies between a number of …rms.
























[p¡ c ¡ (± ¡ 1)s]
dx1
ds
+ [p¡ ¯c ¡(± ¡ 1)s]
dx2
ds
¡(± ¡ 1)x1 ¡(± ¡ 1)x2 = 0
(22)
Substituting expression (6) in equation (22) and from the …rst order con-











¡(± ¡ 1)x1 ¡ (± ¡ 1)x2 = 0
(23)
After some simpli…cations, we obtain the following general expression for
the optimal level of subsidy:
s = ¡p
0(x)x
4 ¡ 3± + R ¡ ±R ¡R(®1 ¡ ®2)2
2±
(24)
If ± = 1, the above expression reduces to expression (10). Therefore, un-
der symmetry between the social and private costs of subsidies, the optimal
subsidy level in an economic union is positive, except if the demand is too
concave and the costs di¤erences are su¢ciently high. However, we can ob-
serve that as ± rises above unity, the optimal output subsidy in the economic
5Lee (1990) and Dick (1993) examine export subsidies with partly foreign-owned
…rms, showing that the optimal export subsidy is always smaller in the presence of cross
ownership.
12union is more likely to be negative. Following Neary (1994), we consider …rst







which is positive if and only if ± < 4=3. Therefore, in the linearcase we obtain
the same result as Neary (1994) for the non-cooperative export subsidies. In
Neary’s (1994) terminology, a subsidy is only justi…ed for …rms which are
more than 75 percent owned by domestic residents.
For non-linear demand, we can show that the threshold value of ± at
which the optimal subsidy switches from a positive to a negative value is:
±
¤ =










¡R ¡ 3R(®1 ¡®2)2
9 + 3R
(27)
The denominator is always positive since 2 + R ¸ 0. The numerator will
be negative for concave demand and positive for convex demand. From this
set of results we obtain the following two propositions:
Proposition 6 The threshold value of ± is lower than 4=3 for concave de-
mand (R > 0) and greater than 4=3 for convex demand (R < 0).
Proof: In the case of a concave demand, the numerator of expression
(27) is always negative. On the other hand, in the case of a convex demand,
the numerator is always positive.
Proposition 7 In the case of symmetric production costs (¯ = 1), the max-
imum value for ± is 2. As asymmetries in production costs increases, the
value increases, with a maximum value for ± of 4.





13Taking the limit when R goes to ¡2, we obtain an upper limit value of ±




For a value of R = ¡2, the upper limit of ± is 4, that is, the output subsidy
is positive when the government values a dollar of its revenue between one
and four dollars of private payo¤. This value is twice that obtained by Neary
(1994) for the non-cooperative pro…t-shifting export subsidy case.
Figure 3 shows the threshold value of the social cost of public funds
as a function of the di¤erences in costs for some particular values of the
curvature of the demand function. If the demand is concave, the threshold
value decreases as di¤erences in costs increases. If the demand is convex, the
threshold value increases as di¤erences in costs increases. Therefore, in our
case the output subsidy is likely to be more positive than in the standard
non-cooperative game when the demand is convex and …rms have di¤erent
costs. This high value for the social cost of public funds is explained by the
fact that when di¤erences in costs are very high and the demand is convex,
the subsidies cause large gains in consumer surplus relative to the subsidy
cost. Ballard et al. (1985) suggest an opportunity cost in the range of 1.17
to 1.56 per dollar raised for the US economy. The maximum value that we
obtain is larger than the empirically plausible values.
[Insert here Figure 3]
4 Conclusions
In this paper we show the importance of cost asymmetry and demand elas-
ticity in the e¤ect of a uniform output subsidy policy for the case of an
economic union in which there are two …rms producing a homogeneous good.
We assume that the union is self-su¢cient in the good and that there is a
common economic authority whose objective is to maximize social welfare.
In so doing, it takes account of the interests of both …rms and consumers in
the union, using the sole instrument at its disposal: an output subsidy. We
…nd that the optimal output subsidy level may be negative (i.e. a tax) if cost
di¤erences are important and the demand is concave.
This policy causes two e¤ects: the homogenization e¤ect and the policy
coordination e¤ect. The …rst e¤ect causes an increase in total production
14in the union, a fall in price and then, an increase in consumer surplus. The
second e¤ect implies that the uniform output subsidy policy in the economic
union causes a change in the production e¢ciency level of the economy of the
union as a whole. We …nd that when R < ¡1, the low cost …rm expands its
market share whereas for R > ¡1 it is the higher cost …rm which expands its
market share. Therefore, this policy a¤ects the level of production e¢ciency
in the economic union. However, we show that, in general, the two …rms
increase their pro…ts, except when the demand is convex and cost di¤erences
are important. In the latter case, the uniform subsidy policy causes a re-
duction in the pro…ts of the less e¢cient …rm. This set of results shows the
importance of …rms heterogeneity across countries and the curvature of the
demand functions in the design of an output subsidy policy in an economic
union (i. e. this can be the case of the European Union).
Finally, we consider an asymmetry between private and social costs, that
is, we take into account that the social cost of public funds can be larger
than unity. We …nd that in the case of a linear demand the threshold shadow
price of public funds for the output subsidy to be positive is 4/3. This value
increase as asymmetries in costs are larger and the demand is more convex,
with a maximum value of 4. This value is larger than the empirical estimated
values, suggesting that even after taking account of the distortionary e¤ect
of raising taxes, an output subsidy policy could be welfare improving in an
imperfectly competitive market in the economic union context.
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16Figure 1. Locus for a zero uniform output subsidy as a function of the
curvature of the inverse demand function and market share differences.-2 -1/("1-"2) -1 1/("1-"2) 0
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Figure 2. Effects on output and market shares of the uniform output subsidy policy.Figure 3. Threshold values of the social cost of the uniform output
subsidy as a function of market share differences.